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(1) LDP presidential election 2006: Tanigaki distinct from Abe, Aso
on use of collective self-defense right

MAINICHI (Page 2) (Abridged)
August 30, 2006

Whether or not to change the government's interpretation of the
Constitution to allow Japan to exercise the right of collective
self-defense has emerged as a campaign issue in the ongoing Liberal
Democratic Party presidential race. Finance Minister Sadakazu
Tanigaki, an advocate of constitutional amendment, criticized Chief

Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, who simply wants to alter the government's interpretation. Foreign Minister Taro Aso has also begun siding with Abe, reversing his previous call for constitutional revision. Abe's standpoint has drawn a backlash from the New Komeito, the LDP's cautious coalition partner.

The right of collective self-defense is the right of any state to jointly prevent by force an attack on a foreign state with which it has close relations, even in the event that the former state has not itself been subjected to such an attack.

According to the government's interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan has the inherent right of collective self-defense but is not allowed to exercise it under the current provisions of the Constitution.

Abe has posed a question about the government's interpretation. His recent book *Toward a Beautiful Country* reads:

"Even if US troops who are mobilized to deal with a contingency in areas surrounding Japan were attacked on high seas by an enemy, the Self-Defense Force would have to leave the scene. How long would the international community tolerate Japan's logic that it has the right to collective self-defense but cannot exercise it?"

On Aug. 22, Abe announced a plan to consider altering the government's interpretation of the Constitution regarding the defense of Japan.

Aso used to repeatedly underscore the need to amend the Constitution instead of modifying its interpretation of it. But he now sides with Abe. He said on an NHK program on Aug. 27: "Changing the government's interpretation (to allow the country to exercise the

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right) is more pragmatic." Aso's about-face may be interpreted as revealing his intention to become prime minister after Abe.

In contrast, Tanigaki is sticking to constitutional revision. He apparently intends to make a clear distinction with Abe and Aso over this issue.

A New Komeito executive predicted: "If Mr. Abe tries to steamroller his view, the coalition arrangement with the LDP will collapse."

(2) Study of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Efforts underway to revise Koizumi policy course pursuing competitive principles

ASAHI (Page 4) (Abridged)
April 31, 2006

On the night of July 26, dozens of business leaders, including Central Japan Railway Company Chairman Kasai and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Chairman Nishioka, dined with Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe at a Japanese restaurant in Tokyo. State Minister in Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy also attended the meeting.

The business leaders in the meeting were members of the Shiki no Kai (Four Seasons Association) composed of executives from more than 20 leading firms mainly in heavy industries, like Tokyo Electric Power, Japan Air Lines, Toyota Motor, and Fuji Photo Film. Most members were in their 60s, far older than Abe. Abe naturally took the role of the listener. He has given priority particularly to its meetings.

Just before the meeting, former Chief Cabinet Secretary Yasuo Fukuda had revealed his intention not to run in the Liberal Democratic Party presidential election. Yosano said in the meeting: "Mr. Abe surfaced as the leading candidate in a moment. I would like to support him." The participants took the remarks as expressing his support for Abe.

After Yosano was defeated in the House of Representatives election in 2000, the Shiki no Kai was inaugurated to encourage him. Yosano brought Abe to a meeting of the Shiki no Kai with him, introducing Abe as "a young capable lawmaker." Abe was just appointed as deputy

chief cabinet secretary.

Kasai, a key member of the association, is an advocate of constitutional revision. Nishioka played a central role when the Japan Business Federation (Nihon Keidanren) proposed a review of the nation's three principles on arms exports in 2004. Their arguments are close to Abe's.

On economic policy, many aides to Abe suggest that he should "entrust economic policy into the hands of reliable experts." In his book titled: *Toward A Beautiful Country*, Abe used most pages for foreign, defense, and education policies, with only less than one fifth devoted to the economic area, including social security.

Yosano is one of the "reliable experts" for Abe. The government's annual economic and fiscal policy guidelines adopted at a cabinet meeting this July contained this expression: "a 21st century-type mild, affluent Japanese society with a combination of economic growth and safety/stability."

A medium-ranking official of the Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare who engaged in drawing up the policy guidelines gave this

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explanation: "In an effort to present Mr. Abe's policy identity, he and Mr. Yosano decided to use the word 'mild'." He added: "The inclusion of the word was intended to underscore that only competitive policy and economic principles are not enough in society."

LDP Policy Research Council Chairman Hidemao Nakagawa also supported Abe in working out measures to cut spending to be included in the policy guidelines. Yosano and Nakagawa launched the Conference on Fiscal and Economic Reforms, a council of the government and the ruling parties, appointing Abe as moderator. The stage is gradually being set for "the Abe administration."

Assistant Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Atsuo Saka instructed director generals from relevant government agencies in early March to map out specific second-chance measures in response to a proposal by Abe.

On March 23, Abe officially announced in a press briefing that the government would set up the Second Chance Promotion Council. One week after that, the council held its first meeting with the participation of the bureau directors to whom Saka had given instructions.

Saka used to be a Finance Ministry official. From just after the inauguration of the Koizumi administration, he undertook the task of drawing up the government's annual economic and fiscal policy guidelines. But he was at odds with then State Minister in Charge of Economic and Fiscal Policy Takenaka, who hated the influence of the Finance Ministry. In 2005 he became vice president at the Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Finance Corporation. This January, however, he assumed the present post designed to help Abe, in response to a request from the Kantei.

Abe has never assumed a portfolio in any influential government agency, so he has no extensive personnel ties in Kasumigaseki government office area. The personnel networks held by Saka are valuable assets for Abe. In mid-May, Abe invited Saka and members of the Second Chance Promotion Council for dinner. A senior official of the Cabinet Secretariat categorically said: "Abe's new brain trust advisors are not from the private sector but are Kasumigaseki officials."

In the private sector, there is puzzlement at Abe, who is trying to play up his own policy identity while deepening his cooperation with bureaucrats.

At the main conference hall in the Kantei on Aug. 25, Abe asked eight representatives from the banking industry, including Japanese Bankers Association Chairman Nobuo Kuroyanagi, to offer financial aid for a second-chance program.

One participant said: "Financing it will involve risk, so government subsidies will be necessary." Many senior executives at leading banks severely evaluate the second-challenge project, one remarking: "This kind of project should have come several years ago, when credit crunch was a serious problem. Abe intends to play this card to the gallery."

Abe's true colors are reflected in recent moves to grope for ways to revise the Koizumi policy course. When a senior member of the Cabinet Office suggested in late June that the office would discuss details about a new body to replace the Regulatory Reform and

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Privatization Promotion Council before it expires at the end of this fiscal year, Abe reportedly grumbled: "Is it still willing to continue the task?"

Whenever he delivers speeches, Abe always cites the importance of public works projects. Abe was quoted as saying to his brain trust advisor who used to be a bureaucrat: "Constructing a San'in expressway is necessary;" and "Extending Shinkansen bullet train lines will turn to be Investment for the future and will contribute to remarkably developing local districts."

Abe also told the brain trust: "Should a large supermarket be opened, local shopping districts will dry up, and festivals will also fade out. That is the current state of local areas."

He implied that if priority were given only to efficiency and competition principles, local communities would be destroyed.

In the Aug. 29 edition, the US newspaper Wall Street Journal noted: "Mr. Abe will not be the second coming of Mr. Koizumi," defining him as "a politician giving priority to agreement." The newspaper also pointed out: "He has indicated a plan to redistribute income to local governments again," adding: "Closed-door politics might begin to be carried out, and the economy might become stalled in Japan again."

(3) Personal network of Shinzo Abe (Part 3): Persons who have gone through a lot support the "prince"

MAINICHI (Page 5) (Slightly abridged)
August 31, 2006

Around 1985 when Japan was in the throes of its bubble economy, Yoshiyuki Inoue, 43, incumbent policy secretary to Chief Cabinet Secretary Shinzo Abe, worked at the now defunct Japan National

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Railways (JNR) as an engine driver for express trains with sleeping berths -- "Asakaze" and "Hayabusa" -- between Tokyo and Kyushu.

Inoue was born into a poor family in Odawara City, Kanagawa Prefecture. He lived with his parents and an older sister in city-provided housing. He entered JNR at the age of 18. While working night shifts, he graduated from the correspondence course of a university.

With the privatization of JNR in 1987, Inoue found a job in the former Prime Minister's Office in 1988. In January 2000 he became an administrative secretary to then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukushiro Nukaga in the cabinet of Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi. He then met then Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Abe in the government of Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori, which was launched following the death of Obuchi. He worked on the issue of abductions of Japanese nationals by North Koreans, in which the public had little interest at that time. He gained Abe's confidence because of his hard work. He said that he learned that protecting the lives and properties of the people was his political responsibility.

After Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi visited Pyongyang in September 2002, Inoue led the work of drafting a bill to support victims kidnapped by North Korea for repatriated abductees. He then worked at the office of communication coordination on abduction issue in the Cabinet Secretariat. He returned to the Prime

Minister's Official Residence and became a policy secretary at the request of Abe who became chief cabinet secretary in late October

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last year.

Inoue is regarded as one of the most likely candidates to become the prime ministerial secretary (for political affairs) when Abe becomes prime minister. In the past, a pattern of veteran secretaries like Isao Iijima, who has served for nearly 30 years as a secretary to Koizumi, assumed the prime ministerial secretary post. If Inoue is picked, it will be an unprecedented case.

Abe, who has a grandfather and granduncle who each served as prime minister, has the tendency of trusting and treating preferentially persons like Inoue who have gone through a lot of hardship. Yoshihide Suga, 57, senior vice minister for internal affairs and communications, is one of them. He formed the Nonpartisan Parliamentary League to Support a Second Chance, and made efforts to have junior and mid-level LDP lawmakers support Abe (in the upcoming party leadership race).

Suga, born into a farm family in Akita Prefecture, came to Tokyo in 1966 and worked in a small factory. After working at another company, he became a secretary to former trade minister Hikosaburo Okonogi. He was then elected to the House of Representatives in 1996.

Suga first belonged to the Obuchi faction (present Tsushima faction). He supported then Chief Cabinet Secretary Seiroku Kajiyama, who ran in the 1998 LDP presidency in revelation against then Foreign Minister Obuchi. He bolted the Obuchi faction along with Kajiyama and former international trade and industry minister Shinji Sato. He chaired the LDP simulation team on sanctions against North Korea. He obtained Abe's confidence by coming up with a sanction plan on his own.

Suga and Inoue got together at a Tokyo hotel on the night of Aug. 8. The two discussed the right timing for Abe to announce his candidacy for the presidency, campaign pledges, and arrangements for an Abe government. The two are putting together the shape of a new government while supporting the "prince."

(4) Security policy a top priority for the next administration

SANKEI (Page 9) (Abridged)
August 31, 2006

By Satoshi Morimoto, Professor and Director, Institute of World Studies, Takushoku University

Collecting external intelligence vital

Security is a major challenge for Japan. The next administration should give top priority to security policy. The Koizumi administration has enacted many laws and agreements on security. Their implementation requires improvements in the system.

The next administration is urged to establish a national interest committee in the Diet and a national security council in the cabinet to let them plan and deliberate on security policy from a perspective of national interests.

It is also essential to establish an external intelligence agency and a state secrets protection law. An existing Diet resolution must also be revised in order to improve the resolution of the sensors of information gathering satellites.

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The Antiterrorism Special Measures Law must be extended during the next extraordinary Diet session in order to keep the Maritime Self-Defense Force's Indian Ocean mission alive, adding to its mission such duties as warning, monitoring, and providing

intelligence. The next administration is also advised to enact US military assistance promotion legislation to allow Japan to financially assist in the planned Guam relocation and building a facility to take over Futenma Air Station functions.

Japan is urged to consider building an SDF base in Guam, as well. Maintaining the Japan-US alliance is the top priority for Japan's security, and US force realignment must be realized at all costs. This may entail a review of the National Defense Program Guideline, another challenge.

The approach of enacting special laws on SDF overseas missions has reached its limit. Japan cannot send the SDF on overseas missions swiftly without a permanent law.

Japan should also conclude an agreement with the United States to extend cooperation effectively, as was demonstrated in the wake of the 2004 Indonesian tsunami disaster. That should be followed by guidelines on Japan-US cooperation to respond to natural disasters in the Asia-Pacific region.

Japan must also be prepared for Pyongyang's possible retaliation against Tokyo's diplomatic initiative behind the UN Security Council's adoption of a resolution condemning North Korea's missile launches and financial sanctions.

Japan, US must re-discuss role sharing

Defending US bases in Japan used to be Japan's responsibility. The United States has been pushing ahead with its plan to deploy Aegis vessels and Patriot missiles in Japan to ensure security of its bases here. Japan and the United States must re-discuss role sharing regarding security in Japanese territories.

The Japan Coast Guard is responsible for maritime territorial security, police forces for ground security, and the Ground Self-Defense Force for the security of areas surrounding US bases in Japan. The law needs to be improved to allow the GSDF to guard coastlines and seaside nuclear power plants.

The government has taken steps to give additional duties and roles to the SDF to let them conduct wide-ranging international cooperation activities on one hand and to reduce the number of personnel and equipment on the other. Such steps are unreasonable. They may take a toll on disaster relief, as well.

Japan and the US have also been frontloading missile defense since the test-launches of ballistic missiles by North Korea on July 5. It is important to operate the Japan-US missile defense system under a consistent chain of command.

Japan must possess a sufficient enemy-base strike capability. There is every reason for Japan to equip support fighters with air-to-surface missiles and vessels with ship-to-surface missiles. Japan also must consider developing cruise missiles.

Japan must be allowed to exercise the right of collective self-defense

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For maintaining maritime security, Japan must patrol and conduct warning and surveillance activities in cooperation with other Asian nations. Japan must also resolve the issue of the right of collective self-defense and actively join multinational efforts in the region. A transfer of the command of US Forces South Korea may prompt the US to give up defending that country. For Japan's security, it is essential to realize defense cooperation among Japan, the United States, and South Korea.

Constitutional revision is essential for the country's security policy. It is desirable to enact national referendum legislation first, then revise paragraphs one and two of Article 9 to stipulate the possession of the national defense military that can exercise the self-defense right to defend the nation and its people, and to establish a basic security law and a basic international cooperation

law to ensure effectiveness.

(5) New security era (Section 11)-Striking enemy bases (Part 1): Notion within the bounds of self-defense rights; Enemy base strike differing from US preemptive strike

SANKEI (Pages 1&5) (Full)
August 29, 2006

North Korea's firing of ballistic missiles (on July 5, 2006) has reignited controversy in Japan over the option of striking enemy bases or tekikichi kogeki in Japanese-a wording peculiar to Japan for its exclusively defense-oriented policy or defense-only posture. In terms of international commonsense, the notion of this enemy base strike, as a matter of fact, is tantamount to a "preemptive attack," which constitutes the right of self-defense vested in sovereign states under international law. It is quite different from the US Bush administration's preemptive attack that can be called a "preventive attack," which is not allowed under international law. China and South Korea are decrying Japan for its arguments over this enemy base strike. For one thing, it is mixed up in its terms. The Sankei Shimbun verifies the enemy base strike arguments.

In March 2003, the United States made a 'preemptive attack' on Iraq. This was later regarded as a preventive attack, giving rise to controversy not only in the United States but also in the international community. How did the Bush administration build its logic of preemptive attack while being unable to come up with any hard evidence of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) in the hands of Iraq?

In the spring of 2002, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld-one of those who were adamant on the necessity of attacking Iraq-told Bob Woodward, a well-known reporter for the Washington Post, that terrorist attacks cannot be prevented. The Pentagon chief was quoted in Woodward's book, Plan of Attack, as saying terrorists do not hesitate to do anything at any time. "That's why," Rumsfeld says in the book, "we must strike first." It was several months before the United States announced the so-called Bush doctrine with the option of striking first in its war on terror.

There was a friend standing behind Rumsfeld. This friend told Rumsfeld, "Thomas Moore-who was a British philosopher in the 16th century-also argued about preemptive attack in his book, Utopia." Preemptive attack studied by Rumsfeld and others is not a far-fetched notion but is an old and new idea.

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Meanwhile, US Vice President Cheney stressed that the danger of doing nothing without making an attack is greater than the danger of what the United States would sustain from its preemptive attack. On Sept. 18, 2002, Rumsfeld stated before the US House of Representatives Armed Services Committee that the United States does not need perfect evidence. As is well known, Rumsfeld distanced himself from US Secretary of State Powell, who was cautious about attacking Iraq. The two were wide apart from each other, with the White House and the Pentagon inclining to carry out a preemptive attack on Iraq. Woodward depicts how Powell was in those days, as follows: "He was growing irritated at discussing the use of armed force based on a mere theory, although there's no imminent threat to the United States."

Japan, faced with North Korea's threat, needs to discuss enemy base strike

In an international military sense, a preemptive attack is defined as an attack to be waged against an enemy because there is smoking-gun evidence that tells that enemy's imminent offensive. In the meantime, a preventive attack is defined as an attack to be made against someone who is not posing an imminent threat but could bring about an unacceptable threat in the future before that threat becomes apparent.

The Bush administration's attack on Iraq was regarded as a preventive attack as the Iraq attack was carried out with the Bush

administration remaining unable to prove the existence of WMDs in Iraq and an imminent threat along with it.

This point decisively differs from the notion of a preemptive attack and also from Japan's enemy base strike argument. Furthermore, an enemy base strike is to be carried out "at a time when the enemy has set about an impending incursion on Japan," according to former Defense Agency Director General Shigeru Ishiba's account in his parliamentary reply. This enemy base strike is even more strictly defined than a preemptive attack in an international military sense. However, there are arguments about which stage should be deemed to be the point of time the enemy set about such an impending incursion on Japan.

For instance, if you fire a gun at someone who only has a gun, that is a preventive attack. If you fire first at someone who is training his gun on you, that is a preemptive attack. In the case of striking an enemy base, that would be firing someone who is pointing his gun at you with his trigger finger on.

Way back in the middle of the 18th century, the Seven-Year War broke out to involve countries in Europe. We can trace the template of preemptive attacks back to that war. Prussian King Friedrich first waged an attack on Sachsen. However, the Pact of Paris, a non-belligerency convention concluded after World War I, prohibited preemptive attacks. In those days, however, no one must have imagined what we see today with the advent of WMDs, the spread of international terrorism, and the development of missile technologies.

"In the case of wars in those pastoral days, they could absorb the first strike and they could fight back," says Akira Kato, who was a researcher at the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), a think-tank of the Defense Agency, and is now a professor of international political science at the international faculty of Obirin University. "But," Kato added, "it's too late (to

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counterattack) after sustaining the first strike in the nuclear age."

The Bush administration launched a preemptive attack that can be called a preventive attack. That is also because the Bush administration-touched off by the Sept. 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States on its nerve centers-was seriously concerned about the case where America comes under the first attack from international terrorists with WMDs in their hands.

In April 1996, Japan and the United States issued a bilateral joint security declaration, which was based on a report written by Harvard University Professor Joseph Nye when he was a Pentagon official. In his article carried in the Washington Post dated March 14, 2003, Nye noted the world's entry into the age of "war privatization" with WMDs in the hands of terrorist groups, foreboding that its potential threat would drastically change civilized societies. Nye also defended the Bush administration for its raising of problems, including not only a preemptive attack against an imminent threat but also a preventive attack.

On Oct. 2, 2003, Russia unveiled its new military doctrine for the option of striking first with the use of nuclear arms. In March this year, US Deputy Under Secretary of Defense McCormick reported to the US Congress that China has raised the accuracy of its ballistic missiles in an aim to improve its preemptive strike capability. Both China and Russia do not rule out the possibility of carrying out preventive attacks in the name of preemptive attacks on the grounds of an imminent threat.

"It's up to the country concerned to judge whether its attack on another country is preventive or preemptive," Kato says. "That's an extremely subjective question," he added. In point of fact, it is hard to tell a preemptive attack from a preventive attack in the age of state-of-the-art military technologies and international terrorism.

Meanwhile, North Korea is reportedly preparing an underground

nuclear test. Faced with the threat of North Korea's potential nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles delivering nuclear warheads, Japan will now need to deepen discussions on the advisability of striking enemy bases.

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